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Following the big transformations of the 1990s, enterprise structure and technological level seem to
have become stabilised in Hungary. Under these circumstances it is especially interesting to identify
the elements responsible for competitiveness in general, and the role technology plays in develop-
ment in particular, according to managers experienced in production and marketing. This empirical
study – based on in-depth interviews and field research – summarises characteristics of the techno-
logical level in the sectors examined, role of technology and labour in production, effects of foreign
direct investment, relations between competition and firm-level factors determining competitive-
ness, and concludes by summing up those most frequently mentioned proposals that should be incor-
porated into economic policy according to managers. Main findings indicate that more qualified,
more intensive and cheaper labour can be substituted for high technology. The competitiveness of an
enterprise is not determined by technology alone, but rather by a combination of technology, the pa-
rameters of available labour and the costs of investment increasing productivity. The insufficiency
of inter-company relations, together with a shortage of available assets necessary for investment
constitute the major threat undermining the competitiveness of enterprises in present-day Hungary.
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INTRODUCTION
Although Adam Smith laid the foundation of modern political economics by
field research (showing the division of labour through the example of needle pro-
duction), economists mainly prefer mathematical models and statistical analyses,
while relatively few of them seek opportunities of direct experience – albeit theory
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can hold only if exposed to the permanent test of experience. However, experience
is an essential means also of getting to know the changes, new aspects, obstacles
and aspirations, while it is often almost the sole source of exploring some special
characteristics of production.
As the quintessence of his study, based on experiences of economists excellent
in empirical research, summarising the limits, opportunities and possibilities of
widening the methods of field research, Helper (2000) emphasises that field re-
search can serve as a starting point, and even a direct source of economic theories.
The reader is holding a summary of an empirical research based on a field re-
search in his/her hand. By means of in-depth company interviews we were look-
ing for answers to the questions: What is the relationship between the technologi-
cal level of enterprises in Hungary and their competitiveness? What kind of eco-
nomic policy could contribute most to the growth of competitiveness? In order to
collect sufficient information, we interviewed 25 manufacturing companies and 6
industry associations representing the interest of 5 industries: confectionery, gar-
ment, car spare-parts, test and measuring instruments, and castings. When select-
ing the industrial branches, our guiding principles were that (1) both “leading” in-
dustries and those “lagging behind” in technology should be represented in the
sample, (2) both technology- and labour-intensive manufacturing industries
should be included, and (3) branches integrated by TNCs should be represented,
as well as the ones having greater independence.
All together 31 interviews were made by the author, a minimum of 5 interviews
in each industrial branch. She also visited twelve factories in order to gain
first-hand experience about the manufacturing process in all the branches studied.
Industrial branch summaries were assembled based on the interviews and com-
pany case studies. The current situation and problems outlined by the 31 managers
boasting with considerable professional, managerial knowledge and experiences
point far beyond pure empiricism incorporating the possibility of uniqueness. The
most important lesson of the research is that many identical principles and pro-
posals arose from the various interviews, regardless of industrial branch, enter-
prise size, or extent of success.
Of course, there are sectoral and enterprise (product) specialities. However, in
an interesting way the order of principle is the same: the criteria for the company’s
competitiveness are identical even if the conditions for creating them in the given
branch or in the given enterprise are more or less different.
In the last decade quite a few company surveys (questionnaires or interviews)
have been conducted in this topic in Hungary, such as e.g. Szalavetz (2000), Min-
istry of Education (2000), Harsányi et al. (2001), Hamar (2004) or Chikán et al.
(2004). Especially the latter study bears a lot of similarities to our results: manag-
ers’ expectations of a stable monetary policy, their perception of taxes and fees,
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the overruling ambition for cost-effectiveness (rather than for technological up-
grading in itself), the opinion that the biggest impediment to innovation is the lack
of sufficient financial resources, just to mention a few of the common findings.
1. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND VALIDITY OF THE SAMPLE
In the sample the number of employees of the enterprises examined ranged from 2
to 1700, while their annual turnover was between 168 million and 14 billion HUF.
Out of the 25 enterprises 5 is small (employs less than 50 persons), 10 is medium
(from 50 to 250 employees) and 10 is large (over 250 persons). The ownership
structure is as follows: 16 Hungarian, 7 foreign, 2 mixed. The total number of em-
ployees in the 5 branches examined might range from 160,000 to 170,000 persons
(based on the estimation of the industry associations, which is hampered by volun-
tary data reporting and inconsequent sectoral classification).
The share of export varies in the enterprises examined, ranging from 25% to
100%. The value added is usually around 30%, it is 50–60% in the testing and
measuring instrument industry, but in case of certain innovative products of high
software content it may reach 90%. The financial situation of the enterprises range
from loss to a gain of 7–10% and in case of certain products it is extremely high
(50–55%, in case of own marketing even 80–85%). The financial situation of sev-
eral firms currently showing a deficit or merely a small profit was much better at
the end of the 90s.
Gross production of the five sub-branches investigated (confectionery, gar-
ment, car spare-parts, testing and measuring instruments, castings) represents
9–10% of the Hungarian manufacturing industry. The sample companies produce
circa 80 billion HUF and employ more than 9000 people in total. This means that
their activity accounts for 6–7% of the sub-branches’ production and 0.6–0.7% of
the Hungarian manufacturing output and employment. If we take only companies
with more than 4 employees into consideration, the share of our sample is 1.1% in
Hungarian manufacturing.
As far as geographical structure is concerned, the majority of sample compa-
nies and their factories are located in or around Budapest, this region being
heavily overrepresented compared to the national geographical structure of Hun-
garian manufacturing. This is the case for south-east Hungary (20% of the facto-
ries surveyed), too. In the sample, 10–13% of the factories are located in north-
east and north-west Hungary, which is about the national average, while south-
west Hungary with only one factory is heavily underrepresented.
To sum it up, the sample primarily represents medium- and large-scale, Hun-
garian-owned companies, located in the more industrialised subregions of Hun-
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gary. This fact may show the possible relevance of our investigation for research-
ers and also for economic policymakers in our globalising world: the endeavours
and difficulties in modernising production technology and competitiveness in a
segment of the Hungarian industry, which could serve as the engine of employ-
ment-generating development.
2. THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL OF PRODUCTION
2.1 The technological features of the sectors
Based on the research, the estimated average life of the machines used in the sec-
tors is 10–20 years, but differences are rather large both between firms and inside
enterprises. Almost everywhere either quite new machines, or 2- to 3-year-old
ones can be found, but machines that are 30 (maybe 40–60) years old can fre-
quently be seen as well. However, the age of the machine is not always decisive!
For example, a mechanical pressing machine – with proper maintenance – can
completely fulfil its function even if it is 60 years old. Old machines can be up-
graded with certain accessories (e.g. conveyor) or with minor modernisations;
what is more, with new electronics old machines may be improved even to a
state-of-the-art level (e.g. turning or milling machines).
In comparison to the EU level, the enterprises estimated their own technology
at 3 on a five-grade scale, on the average. However, the average value does not say
much here, either. The scores range from 2 to 5 (or, in a few cases, the interview-
ees would rate their technology as more advanced than the technology available
on the European market). The backwardness is greater in production technology
than in development, where the instruments (testing and measuring instrument in-
dustry) represent top level (score 4 or 5). In agreement with this finding, back-
wardness relative to the EU top level amounts to about 10 years on the average
(varying between 20 years of disadvantage and 5 years advantage). It appears
from the answers that each mark represents 5 years, implying that technology re-
news at such intervals on the world market.
Compared to the peripheral countries of the EU, technology level is generally
evaluated to be one score higher, i.e. at score 4 (deviation 3–5, or above) the back-
wardness is usually 5 years. In comparison to Eastern Europe, the firms gave score
4 or better to their own technology and in all sectors we can find enterprises putt-
ing themselves above the Eastern European level. At the same time, several man-
agers in several sectors pointed out that there was high-technology in the Eastern
Europe, too, adding that in the given sector ex-socialist manufacturers – not inde-
pendently of nearly located Western productive capital – are “catching up” in
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terms of both technological level and competitiveness of products (quality, deliv-
ery time, etc.). Nevertheless, it seems that the majority of the Hungarian manag-
ers neglect the development in Eastern Europe. It seems as if their present suc-
cesses and seemingly safe markets made them less cautious concerning potential
competition from Eastern market players.
To sum it up, the examined manufacturing firms are characterised by medium
technological level. At the same time, the instruments of production show a mixed
picture, which is generally characteristic of the world market as well. This techno-
logical level and structure meets the small-scale, special or unique product pat-
tern characteristic of all sectors requiring more living labour compared to mass
production.
2.2 Investment policy
The figure given for the rate of investment to turnover ranges from 3 to 10%, but
characteristically it remains below 4–5%. The rate fluctuates year by year. It is a
characteristic feature of each sector and firm that investments follow short-term
market demands. That is to say, investment is “only a compulsion”, driven by cus-
tomers’ evolving demands and changing marketing conditions. Investments of
great value and extension (e.g. building a new workshop) are made on very rare
occasions, only in case of abundance of current assets (cheap parent-company
credit), otherwise investments are always triggered by a specific order for a stable
market. Consequently there are no medium- or long-term investment plans; in-
vestment is a part of fulfilling “the daily task”. As for the machinery and fixed as-
sets, mainly maintenance or “partial modernisation” (overhaul of old machinery),
and, to a smaller extent, replacement is carried out.
Borrowing, rent and operational lease play an important role in investment.
Borrowing the means of production (sometimes “free of charge”, or rather on the
basis of reciprocity according to circumstances) is more frequent in case of
smaller firms. On the other hand, in the developed market economies big enter-
prises take the opportunity of renting, especially in case of means of transport.
(According to Meinen and Verlinden (1997), renting or leasing costs constitute
20–40% of investments made for export deliveries in the Dutch manufacturing in-
dustry.)
Consequently, competition requires the permanent modernisation of technol-
ogy, but this is not identical to a compulsion to introduce current high technology.
Quality may be strongly improved and the unit cost may be significantly reduced
by means of reorganisation, expansion, rent and lease of machinery, etc. It is also
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worth buying less modern technology, because with some modernisation and by
running it in three shifts (!), competitiveness can be achieved.
Indeed, efficient (large capacity) technologies are to a certain extent in contra-
diction with the flexibility and competitiveness required by the market. New tech-
nology systems, automated machines are extremely expensive, return on invest-
ment is realised in several years (in some cases 10–15 years). Such a long time,
however, is unforeseeable. For this reason in certain cases it is not worth spending
money for the substantial replacement of the technology, even if funds are avail-
able. Investment is not only a matter of money and returns, but also of security
(stable market).
Investments in themselves do not inform us about the capacities, if we do not
know whether or not disinvestments were made at the same time.1 In our sample
the fate of the machines sorted out as scrap varies even inside a sector. Sale, stor-
ing and – rarely – also destruction takes place. As to selling, various approaches
are observable. Some are careful to prevent their competitors putting their hands
on the machines, moreover, they avoid selling discarded machines to their sub-
contractors in order “not to damage quality” (car spare-parts industry). In other
sectors, to comply with market conditions, old machines are sold to smaller enter-
prises in order to create subcontractors with the capacity to manufacture in case of
capacity shortages resulting from certain orders, or boom (e.g. garment industry).
Summarising the above, investments are not motivated by the goal of raising
productivity or managing the necessary labour, but rather by gaining market
share and cost-saving, realisable also in many other ways. For this reason the in-
vestment policy of the examined enterprises is not planned, but “project-prin-
cipled” everywhere. The lack of capital often halts this project-principled invest-
ment practice. In such a case enterprises borrow or buy used machines from each
other (e.g. clothing industry).
2.3 R&D
The role research and development plays in competitiveness is practically known
in economic theory since Leontief’s works. In addition to the subsequent develop-
ment of this theory – mainly owing to Hughes’ (1986) work and most of all on the
basis of his model – since the 80s a lot of empirical researches have dealt with the
strong correlation between R&D and world market competitiveness measured by
the ratio of export. As for the Finnish industry Vuori (1997) and in the case of the
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1 On disinvestment see e.g. Smeets and van den Hove (1997) on the example of the Dutch indus-
try.
Hungarian industry Török and Petz (1999) have demonstrated the export-pro-
moting effect of R&D specialisation, although – as they highlight – this correla-
tion is not universal.
According to the field research of Szanyi (2002), during the transition the em-
phasis of R&D activity at Hungarian enterprises has been shifted from basic and
applied research to product development. By the end of the 90s, the initial pro-
cesses of technological modernisation and product innovation slowed down, ow-
ing to its relation to foreign direct capital. Our research supports this statement.
There is scarcely any example in Hungary for high-tech activity, basic and applied
research and real innovation at the enterprise level at present. It is only partial
product development and minor modification of technologies that are going on.
Therefore, R&D is mainly limited to production and product development, R&D
departments are rarely found, R&D intensity is very low.
Products tend to be developed in accordance with the existing technology.
Moreover, technological solutions and investments are determined by the ordered
(or newly developed) products. Development of production is carried out typi-
cally only if it is required by the product. It became evident from the interviews
that in the end it is not the technology that counts, but the product. Technology is
subordinated to the products and products are determined by the market (de-
mand, customer, multinational owner). In our sample the only exception was the
testing and measuring instrument industry, where innovation, i.e. the develop-
ment of a new product “from scratch” is the key factor of staying on the market.
3. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LIVING LABOUR IN PRODUCTION
3.1 The role of technology
Technology is a factor of competitiveness. However, it was pointed out by all the
companies without exception that using high technology is not the only way to as-
sure competitiveness. All technology can be upgraded by more or less comple-
mentary modernisation. Technology, however, depends on the scale of production
and products, too. From the point of view of technology, the world market is not
homogeneous. Mass production needing the most up-to-date technology is the
privilege of the biggest enterprises of the world market.
The age of machinery matters mainly because of the additional costs arising
from failure and maintenance (stoppages and repairs), which have nothing to do
with the price of a new machine. On the other hand, speed and quality can be in-
creased and defect rate decreased by more automated technology, but living la-
bour may also improve these indicators. For this reason, cost-reducing invest-
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ments can be substituted by living labour to a certain extent, which extent, of
course, is determined by the characteristics of the product and the quality require-
ments.
The experiences gained by the enterprises support the following relationship:
in the long run competitiveness can only be ensured by decreasing the ratio of
living labour, i.e. by increasing productivity. Competitiveness means efficiency,
i.e. low unit cost. However, reducing costs (cost/unit), or increasing efficiency
(profit/total investment) are not identical to increasing productivity (unit/working
hour) and these indicators do not go hand in hand. To increase productivity, only
such an investment is worth carrying out which simultaneously reduces the (unit)
costs. It is worth introducing the more up-to-date technology only if returns are
quick, that is to say, if it is not too expensive, or more generally, if it saves more
living labour than what it costs. The replacement of living labour with technology
is always a question of rate of returns. The point, where investment in technology
becomes inevitable is determined by calculating the relations between the price of
labour and the maximum of work possible (amount, intensity), as well as the price
of the more productive means of production. In other words, the question is
whether the unit cost of production remains lower by keeping the present technol-
ogy (and increasing the intensity, i.e. the amount of work), or by investing into
new, more productive, automated technology (taking amortisation into account).
The above statement was expressed in a concentrated form by one of the sub-
sidiary company managers of a multinational enterprise manufacturing car
spare-parts: in addition to quality, “investment in technology reducing costs (au-
tomation)” is the most important factor of competitiveness. One of the experts at
the labour-intensive garment sector, an industry where automation is difficult, un-
derlined the difference between cost-reduction and productivity increase as fol-
lows: “it is not the machine, but the cost, including the wage that is the decisive
factor”.
The results of our research are in harmony with the correlation calculations of
Buzás and Novák (2004), who found no provable relation between the productiv-
ity of an enterprise (technology) and profitability (rate of profit) in a significant
part of the manufacturing sector in Hungary. The mixed technological level of the
manufacturing industry in Hungary makes it possible to operate less automated
technologies, lagging 5–10 years behind the technological level of the world mar-
ket, in a competitive (profitable) way. This, however, involves the consequences
that where living labour is substituted for more productive technology, the social
worktime basis is wasted (it remains locked up in the production to a greater ex-
tent than necessary).
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3.2 The role of labour force
In some companies qualifications were considered unimportant (“no need for spe-
cial qualifications of manpower”) and they were on the opinion that skilled work
cannot replace proper technology. However, the majority of managers inter-
viewed thought that skilled and/or cheap labour could compensate for their com-
panies’ competitive disadvantage deriving from outdated technology, at least to a
certain extent. (For example, the security of production cannot be maximised by
living labour. In case of work done by humans, only a smaller defect rate can be
ensured by (manual) control, while the automated machine makes no fault. Be-
sides, manpower is unable to perform certain operations in the required quality,
e.g. to sew “eye-form button-holes” in the garment sector.) What are behind the
different opinions?
In case of highly automated production, less living labour, even less skilled
work is needed. Where the technology is still incomplete, more living labour and
more professional knowledge (skill) is necessary. Consequently, with the prog-
ress of automation, the importance of creativity and qualifications declines. How-
ever, this general tendency develops at a different rate both by sector and by enter-
prise. In labour-intensive sectors (e.g. garment industry) or in case of special prod-
ucts (e.g. certain measuring instruments) produced in small series, or handicraft,
machinery cannot substitute for the living labour to such a degree as in
mass-produced car spare-parts. Depending on the range of products and the devel-
opment of the applied technology, the opinions about the role of living labour
(skill) can be different as well.
Furthermore, the requirements of professional knowledge of product develop-
ment and those of production must be separated from each other. Product develop-
ment requires high qualifications, for example, in the domestic measuring equip-
ment industry. Parallel with the progress of technology, labour is gradually
squeezed out from production. Qualification of manpower and operation are here
factors substituting each other. However, from the point of view of productivity,
up-to-date technology cannot be replaced by labour above a certain limit. As for
product development, qualifications and abundance of novel ideas are crucial,
thus making the story somewhat different from that in production. However, as
the automation of product development advances, experiences show a similar
trend to that observable in production, though more slowly and to a smaller extent:
sophisticated softwares, testing and measuring instruments are increasingly tak-
ing over the role of living labour and professional knowledge. (Quoting the man-
ager of a development-oriented company: “the ratio of wage could be reduced by
better softwares”.)
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For this reason, properly skilled manpower is, partly and in inverse proportion
to the applied technological level, able to substitute for technology and compen-
sate for competitive disadvantage stemming from underdeveloped technology.
However, the price at which this happens also has relevance. The price of labour
and the substitution process of living labour by machinery – as said in the chapter
about the role of technology – are in close connection. At present the price of Hun-
garian labour force is low enough so that on the basis of cost management it is
usually not worth substituting it for a higher productivity solution. Our empirical
study proves, however, that this situation results in additional work and an in-
crease of labour intensity.
3.3. Qualifications
As pointed out already, together with living labour the role of skilled work also de-
creases as a consequence of the general technological tendency. However, consid-
ering the medium technological level of the Hungarian manufacturing industry,
skilled labour is still of great importance.
Several managers stress the fact that the sole stable competitive advantage of
the enterprises lies in the (still) existing professional knowledge and experience.
This confirms our statements concerning the substitution of skilled work and tech-
nology. It was also frequently emphasised that capabilities of Hungarian skilled
workers far surpass those of Western ones.
In contrast, the situation of vocational training, and the supply of skilled work-
ers was severely criticised almost everywhere, and not any of the managers was
satisfied with the present situation. The supply of qualified, innovative workers
working in higher positions in the organisation is not guaranteed satisfactorily ei-
ther. Only those companies failed to emphasise the deficiencies of the voca-
tional/high level training where applied technology has already rendered the need
for both skilled workers and professional knowledge secondary.
Enterprises know by experience that the lack of qualifications, as well as insuf-
ficient, or lacking practical/workshop education is an enormous problem, “those
who work in the workshop know best where the shoe pinches”. If skilled labour is
able to replace (expensive) technology to a certain extent, it is understandable to
what a high degree the lack of qualified manpower hampers the competitiveness
of the enterprises in Hungary.
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4. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
4.1. Development of technology
It is generally accepted that in the age of globalisation, in addition to the enter-
prises’ own development efforts and the purchase of machinery or know-how
(embodied technology), the technology-developing role of the spillover effects of
foreign capital investment is increasing. However, the extent of the spillover is
disputed. For example, Vuori (1997) emphasises that to make use of these effects,
on top of the donors’ development, special conditions are needed in the host coun-
try. These conditions are as follows: openness, capability for absorbing new tech-
nologies and adjusting them to their own requirements. Due to the fact that not ev-
ery country disposes of these capabilities, the practical importance of interna-
tional technological spillover lags behind its theoretical importance.
Investors’ cost-optimalising strategy also contributes to the formulation of lim-
its to the practical importance of the international technological spillover. This
phenomenon may be illustrated by the example of the global sourcing strategy of
FIAT, which tries to meet a double challenge according to Camuffo and Volpato
(n.d. – p. 26). On the one hand, it tries to find subcontractors able to ensure a
world-wide optimal combination of cost, quality and service, on the other hand,
the company attempts to standardise each and every element of the given model at
all production and assembly plants. If we give it a thought, it becomes evident that
in this strategy, in addition to the possibility of spillover, an attitude of isolation
with a neutral effect on technological development is also included. In other
words, the investor relies mainly on and selects between the existing conditions of
production.
The limitations of the influence of the foreign capital on the technological de-
velopment were proved by Artner (2000; 2004) and by Farkas (2000) in the cases
of Ireland and Hungary, respectively. At the same time, Hamar’s (2004) empirical
study covering five accession countries, among them Hungary, found an unam-
biguous influence of the inflow of direct capital investment on the technological
catching-up, but in fact together with an extreme heterogeneity of the subsidiary
companies.
According to our experiences gained at the enterprises examined, the direct and
indirect influence of foreign direct capital investment on the technological devel-
opment is limited, more or less accidental and depends strongly on the investor.
Foreign enterprises in Hungary give work to a great number of suppliers. At the
same time, their location could be anywhere, they can delocate any time, making
Hungary vulnerable.
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According to one of the interviewees who knows foreign investors well, the
multinational companies came to Hungary because wages and costs of environ-
mental protection are relatively low here. Consequently, they primarily chose to
transfer not the high-tech, but rather their outdated technology to Hungary. How-
ever, this situation cannot be sustained in the long term, “since they want to realise
the same returns here, as they do at home by operating their new machines”. In
addition, the tax and social securities burden of the Hungarian labour power are
bigger than those of the neighbouring countries. Thus, the foreign company will
either invest (modernise) or – if it is more profitable – delocate.
One of the managers of a multinational company admitted that Hungary’s ad-
vantage lies in the fact that the number of working days are high, holidays are less
and thanks to labour-market regulations “the manpower can be employed a more
flexible way”. Consequently, these factors make the utilisation of outdated tech-
nologies more profitable in Hungary.
This provides an explanation for huge technology imports that took place in the
form of assets in kind (old machinery) mainly in the first half of the 90s. By now,
the role of the reinvestment of profits has increased, but the relocation of the old
machinery is still going on. Together with the foreign capital new means of pro-
duction also arrived in our country in a number of cases, a part of them embodying
high-tech equipment. This, however, is not a general phenomenon.
We have learnt from our interviewees that in certain cases the firm is subject to
sale and purchase, but neither the old, nor the new owner is ready to transfer tech-
nology, or invest in new equipment. In these cases, at best, assistance is given to
establish the integrated system of IT-management, which is the basic condition
for communication and control. Generally, foreign owners aim to reduce require-
ments for living labour by reorganisations and automation that are accompanied
also by increasing labour intensity almost everywhere. For instance, in one of the
enterprises the output per worker increased by 72% between 1993 and 2003 as a
result of “rationalisations” (dismissals), instead of technological development.
The same owner still believes that the workers are overpaid.
The experiences of the enterprises prove that foreign capital per se has no tech-
nological upgrading effect. As in the case of all forms of capital, the aim of the for-
eign capital is to realise profit. Only those owners invest in development that
count on the profit-production capability of the affiliated company in the long run.
Whether the investor is a professional, or a financial one was found not to influ-
ence development considerations. Though the financial investors are more in-
clined to look for solutions promising quicker profit, we also found counter-
examples – both for professional investor’s negligence, even “robbing” the com-
pany, and for a financial investor’s insistence on development.
Acta Oeconomica 55 (2005)
328 A. ARTNER
If the foreign investor is simply a partner of the Hungarian company, it can still
provide inspiration for the Hungarian company’s development by intermediating
the requirements of the world market. However, it would be a mistake to attribute
these effects to “foreign capital”. The point is merely that competition as it is, has
a developmental effect: if I want to sell, I have to adapt to the requirements and to
accept necessary alterations that promote sale figures.
4.2. Other forms of modernisation effects
Several companies in Hungary have learnt business management and working
culture from their foreign owner or supplier. However, the foreign way does not
necessarily imply a “better” way than the previous practice. It means, above all,
the adoption of the methods of the company(-empire) practises on the world mar-
ket. (Naturally, one has to accommodate to a new partnership characterised by a
new owner, new customers, often new products. This situation requires adaptation
mainly from the partner at the bottom of the hierarchy.) This hand-over and
take-over basically takes place according to the foreign owners’ ideas without
consulting the partner, i.e. independently of the (admittedly good) local experts’
opinion whether the change is rational (Hungarian experts often considered
changes unadvisable). However, in the cases of the companies involved in our re-
search there was no knowledge transfer at all. In all the sectors it was a general
experience that foreign investors usually have nothing to add to the high level of
expert knowledge and experience available in Hungary. This is the reason behind
the quick and successful application of the newer technologies (machinery) as
well.
Concerning foreign capital, Hungarian companies have extraordinary negative
experiences, too. We have already mentioned the owner’s general attitude of
negligence, later passing the company into the hands of other firms. Moreover,
small companies are at the mercy of the big ones in other ways as well. The re-
quirements of the chain stores or the payment and contractual terms of the final
product manufacturers are often disadvantageous for small firms. As a matter of
fact, this phenomenon characterises the fierce competition between bigger and
smaller companies (power of capital) rather than the relationship between foreign
and Hungarian owned companies, i.e.: the capability of the bigger capitals for de-
priving the profit of the smaller capitals by means of their better position of power.
This “vertical” cut-throat competition means limiting the competition and hin-
dering the accumulation of capital of the smaller companies, namely their growth
on the one hand, and promoting the concentration and centralisation of capital on
the other.
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5. COMPETITIVENESS
Competitiveness, as well as the problems of the examined sectors fit into the gen-
eral parameters of the existence of small- and medium-sized enterprises. As a con-
sequence of the change of the regime in Hungary, big, integrated enterprises hav-
ing market and capable of technological development have disappeared. In addi-
tion to that – as one of interviewees said – “the state did not help to make good use
of the knowledge and the means of production in the new system, but actively took
part in smashing vertical integrations”.
These companies, left to their own devices, are currently trying to find their po-
sition on the market. In this endeavour they can rely on the means of production,
expert knowledge and experience they control only to a certain extent. Due to the
shortage of capital, however, these companies are unable to capture a firm market
position alone. The reason is that the market segments (manufacturing small se-
ries and/or special, high quality products) that are still covered by them today are
threatened to be narrowed by the competition of the cheap labour in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries and also by big and technologically advanced enterprises,
which dispose over complete manufacturing systems capable for small and spe-
cial serial production.
5.1. The competitive environment
Today Hungarian companies compete on the world market. Domestic (national)
competition takes place only in consumer goods (confectionery and garment in-
dustry, in our sample). There is competition both in manufacturing products and in
supplier and subcontracting relations. Regarding subcontracting, the Eastern
(and the Far-Eastern) competition, while for the component supply, the competi-
tion of the close and remote suppliers of multinational companies are on the rise.
The relocation of the Western (Southern) suppliers of car-factories has also started
towards Hungary, increasing competition and overshadowing the future of still
booming Hungarian car-parts production.
Mechanisms determining substitution between technology and living labour
have an effect on the allocation of capital, residing behind the above phenomenon.
The development of the technology is only one of the elements of cost reduction.
From the profit point of view, the less productive technology “can be revived” by
using cheaper labour force. As the introduction of new technologies is justified by
the relatively high wages of the developed countries, the less productive technolo-
gies are relocated towards further East. This phenomenon was firstly captured by
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Vernon (1966) in his product life-cycle theory. The technologies flow into
cheap-labour countries in waves. Simultaneously, the market position of the inde-
pendent manufacturers of the products made by these technologies is also chang-
ing. Hungary is in the middle of this process. For a time she can enjoy – at a differ-
ent rate in each sector – the inflow and boom, then as competition sharpens, she
will suffer from outflow.
The garment industry may serve as a typical example. By now, Hungarian
SMEs know exactly that current trends foreshadow the relocation of the produc-
tion to the East (to Romania, Ukraine), keeping only product development and
perhaps logistics at home. Consequently, we can see the repetition of the same
process we experienced with the inflow (and in many cases with the outflow as
well) of the Western European garment producers. The question is: what will hap-
pen to employment? (In the garment industry 67,000, in the whole textile-gar-
ment-leather industry 170,000 people were employed in 2003.)
Contrary to this perspective, an alternative would be to build vertical integra-
tion (“verticums”) coordinated by big organisations in all important industrial sec-
tors. According to many managers, this is the only viable alternative for survival.
5.2. The factors of competitiveness
5.2.1. Quality
Concerning the sectors of manufacturing intermediary goods (castings, car-parts
in our sample), it is necessary to clarify the widely spread opinion on the competi-
tion in quality: there is no competition in quality as such, the quality is a kind of
“market admission fee”. Those who are unable to produce in the required quality
are ruled out of competition. The most important factor of competitiveness is
price. And price competition is very intense.
Regarding the manufacturers of final goods (garment, confectionery and mea-
suring instrument industry in our sample), the situation is a bit different. On the
market of these products different qualities are available (the Hungarian industry
belongs to the manufacturers of higher quality products), but here also, price is a
key question of the competition at all levels of quality. On top of this, low price en-
sures a certain room for manoeuvre, which proves useful in cases when the buyers
want the prices to be reduced, even at the expense of “something being taken out
of the product” by the manufacturer. For the sake of a lower price, the buyers are
ready to make a contract with the manufacturer of a less sophisticated product. In
the sectors of special and innovative products such as, for example, the testing and
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measuring instrument industry, quality is represented by the product, by the inno-
vation, or by specificity itself. This means that the quality is not decisive here ei-
ther: it is the question of price and available capital whether the product is mar-
ketable.
5.2.2. Costs
Naturally, cost is a crucial factor determining price. The economic environment,
the sectoral conditions, as well as the business strategy determine how the cost
could be reduced in each sector and in each company. According to the conclu-
sions of this research, the wage and – in certain sectors – energy costs constitute
the biggest burden for the Hungarian manufacturing industry. Not only wages
themselves, but also their additional costs are considered too high. This causes a
headache especially for decision-makers in labour-intensive sectors (e.g. garment
industry), but other sectors of the Hungarian manufacturing industry are also
gravely affected. The reason is that Hungarian industry mainly consists of small-
and medium-sized enterprises manufacturing non-serial, special products, their
technology requiring more living labour than those of the top players of the world
market even in sectors easier to be automated (producing bigger series, more
standardised products).
The present structure of the Hungarian industry (i.e. a majority of small- and
medium-sized enterprises) cannot be sustained for long, because technological
development will sooner or later push them out of their present market segment.
On the one hand, technology develops into a direction of combining the capability
for mass production and special products, while on the other hand cheap labour
manufacturers of mass production learn more and more of how to produce supe-
rior quality goods. The Hungarian industry consisting of “small” organisations
compared to the world market has not, and will not have the capability – i.e. with-
out an external help – to take advantage of mass production.
5.2.3. Capital endowment
The research has confirmed that capital endowment (current assets) is a decisive
factor of competitiveness. Capital endowment determines the applicable price
strategy (whether and to what extent the manufacturer can reduce the price when
introducing the product), whether the company can finance marketing, whether it
can sell its products directly or needs an intermediate, what terms of payment it
can accept, whether it is capable of developing its own product or can execute sub-
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contracting only, etc. Thus, the implementation of cost-cutting investments de-
pends on capital endowment, too. Price competition and the dictating position of
bigger (buying, trading) enterprises hamper the accumulation of capital, so the
shortage of working capital is a general and permanent problem even for compa-
nies employing more than 250 people, and it is a source of uncertainty of survival
for smaller companies. Consequently, the condition of holding one’s ground on
the market is the (working) capital endowment, the capability for growth, which
cannot – or on rare occasions can – be obtained in today’s monopolistic market
competition. This is a Catch-22 situation.
As we can see, the most important handicap of competitiveness for the Hungar-
ian manufacturing industry is an enterprise structure characterised by the short-
age of capital. The problem of the Hungarian industry is a general problem of
small firms and the responsibility for this situation mainly lies in the disruption of
production complexes at the time of the change of regime (i.e. blowing up the sys-
tems of vertical enterprise relations, as well as the negligence for rebuilding
them).
5.2.4. Technology
Developed and unique technology is considered to be just one among the several
factors of competitiveness by the managers interviewed. In the final analysis, it is
not technology (productivity), but unit cost that really counts. The companies ex-
amined share the opinion that their technology is basically appropriate, suitable
for producing competitive products. Every technology has got advantages and
disadvantages, strong and weak sides. It is just the diversity of their technology,
i.e. their capability for manufacturing many kinds of products which enable them
to compete, often serving as the key factor to keeping their market position.
5.2.5. Marketing
If, besides the required quality, lowest price is the necessary condition, then mar-
keting constitutes the sufficient condition of competitiveness. The latter is diffi-
cult to secure in case of companies provided with limited amounts of capital. Sec-
toral research carried out by Hernesniemi et al. (1996) in the Finnish economy
(characterised by a company structure quite similar to the Hungarian one) found
that – besides finance and knowledge of business strategy – marketing was the
very function, which did not keep pace with the increase of the companies’ techno-
logical level. This is a severe disadvantage in competitiveness, because without
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sufficient marketing technological knowledge cannot be successfully commer-
cialised.
During the Hungarian research in all the sectors several people emphasised
that competitiveness depends on marketing and gaining market share rather than
on technology. The best product cannot be sold if customers do not get acquainted
with it. Marketing is, however, expensive, so the majority of the companies cannot
afford it to the satisfactory extent.
5.2.6. Labour force
Either based on a positive or on a negative experience, many interviewees pointed
out that the loyalty of the labour force is also a factor of competitiveness. Based on
our interviews, loyalty appears to be considered even more important than profes-
sional knowledge. (What is professional knowledge worth, if labour force does
not work with absolute devotion?)
Managers try to promote identification with the company applying different
forms of payment, based on performance. The question is whether “loyalty”
gained in one way or another means a real identification with the interests of the
privately owned company, or it reflects a mere compulsion stemming from em-
ployees’ adherence to their jobs. This question is not an academic one, because it
refers to identification with the work and in the end to the possible maximum of
quantitative and qualitative productivity.
The price of labour means an ever increasing competitive disadvantage for the
manufacturing industry in Hungary. The shortages of cheap labour stimulate the
relocation of production, which, together with the process of cost management
mentioned above and through unemployment and the decreasing demand for
skilled work, results in the deterioration of the working conditions and the reduc-
tion of the wages in the long run.
5.2.7. Company management
Some of the interviewees brought up the issue of managers’ mentality, since the
ability of reacting quickly and adequately to market demands, proper company
management (based on up-to-date management theories), as well as the structure
of enterprises may also be regarded as factors influencing competitiveness.
Fujimoto (2001) pointed out the role of these factors discussing “organisational
capability” which was able to counterbalance the decrease in international techno-
logical competitiveness of the Japanese car industry. This capability explains the
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Japanese advantage2 in the “lead time” (LT). The organisational capability of the
company may ensure market advantage even in case of a moderately intensive ap-
plication of information technology. (This phenomena is called “IT-LT para-
dox”.)
5.2.8. Personal relations
Many interviewees underlined that personal contacts have an outstanding impor-
tance in successful company start-up, sales, gaining market share and new part-
ners. In the market competition price, as well as profit-making motives do play a
decisive role, but in the often fierce and uncertain environment everybody is try-
ing his best to eliminate uncertainties. Contrary to the public opinion, market ac-
tors are motivated by the profit relative to the risk, not by the “love of risk”. They
try to optimise the proportion of these two factors, i.e. to relatively minimise risk.
Considering the fact that market relations are realised by people as well, trust – in-
fluencing the perception of risk – plays a central role in business negotiations.
Trust may be obtained in business relations, but under given circumstances by
other means as well. Therefore, the successes of the management (maybe its “un-
just” failures) are based on the scope and quality of their personal (economic, po-
litical) relations. Highlighting the dark side of this phenomenon, several managers
complained about the contact-based, rather than truly professional evaluation pro-
cess of tenders, or spoke frankly about “money distributed in advance” in case of
state distribution of public funds.
6. ECONOMIC-POLICY PROPOSALS – OPINION OF INTERVIEWEES
Although managers came up with several explicit and implicit economic-policy
proposals during our interviews, the general opinion reflected disappointment:
nothing is expected (any more) from the economic policy.
Despite their general state of disillusionment, managers’ suggestions and ideas
are particularly valuable, not because of their novelty (the majority of the propos-
als is probably well-known by the leaders of the country), but because of the fact
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2 Japanese automobile industry conventionally enjoys advantage in the product development
lead time (period from exterior design approval to start of sales). Until the beginning of the
1990s Japanese car producers’ average lead time was about 30 months, while US and Euro-
pean manufacturers reached only cca 40 months. Today the data are less then 20 versus 30
months, respectively. In this respect the competitiveness of Japanese car producers has in-
creased, though, their position in the technological development has been deteriorated. This
deterioration was counterbalanced partly by decreasing lead time.
that with the exception of a couple of specific ones, the majority of the proposals
came up in all the sectors examined. The proposals reflect the most burning prob-
lems of the companies, so all of them are informative and worthwhile to be consid-
ered. For this reason we decided to report even those proposals which cannot be
taken into consideration after careful economic-policy deliberation, according to
market logic, or just because of EU rules, or the implementation of which would
be the task of the companies under general circumstances, even if they are unable
to do so.
Everywhere, almost without exception, the first expectation referred to the reli-
ability of economic policy (exchange rate, trade policy and other regulations).
Many people blamed the policymakers for having a rigid financial approach to
economic policy and an administrative attitude towards development policy. They
pointed out the need for a more flexible credit practice and cheaper credits, as
well as the extension and conceptual revision of the state-funding system (e.g.
stressing not only “fashionable” or “EU-issues”).
In reference to the poor condition of roads, some people emphasised that pri-
marily the state was responsible for developing the infrastructure. Others require
an economic policy which carefully examines the situation, the role, developmen-
tal requirements of the sectors considered “lagging behind” and the far-reaching
effects of their decline. Preparing impact assessment studies before policy deci-
sions were also considered as highly necessary. There is a general discontent re-
garding the regulation of the black economy and firm measures are expected
against the behaviours evading regulations and distorting the market. It is a gen-
eral opinion that the legal system is not transparent and can be manipulated. Many
persons referred to the often incomprehensible, unclear circumstances of access-
ing support (project funding), suggesting the possibility of corruption (“personal
contacts”). The reduction of corporate tax (from 18 to 16%) is generally consid-
ered an ineffective measure, unable to solve the shortage of working capital neces-
sary for the investments.
The overwhelming majority of the companies in the sample would like to see
an effective policy supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises. As corner-
stones of this policy, orders by the state, extension of grants and aids and, in partic-
ular, increased efforts of export promotion and tax relief connected to develop-
ment (!), increasing the limit of co-financing and rationalisation of the conditions
were mentioned. Some additional points, for example promotion of participation
in fairs and exhibitions, as well as maintaining trade representations abroad, sup-
porting storage by means of public or semi-public organisations (since the system
of “just-in-time” charges the suppliers with storage expenses) were also men-
tioned.
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Fitting into the criteria of Porter’s diamond model, it was suggested that prod-
uct development connected to joint projects of Hungarian suppliers and buyers
should be supported, above all. The development of infrastructure could serve as a
good example here. The multiplicator effect of foreign investors is increased
mostly by involving a large number of suppliers. Far-Eastern investors are more
inclined to do this because the relocation of their own suppliers here is still slow,
but at the same time the 60% European content ratio must be met, too.
Local business tax (paid in proportion to turnover) hampers the establishment
of regional (R&D and logistic) centres, because their ratio of living labour is high.
In order to eliminate our disadvantage in this respect, it would be more reasonable
to apply local taxation on a profit basis, especially considering the fact that Hun-
gary’s neighbours (e.g. Slovakia, the Czech Republic) do not impose local busi-
ness tax on firms at all.
Enterprises would like the government to support and improve vocational
training, and make it more practice-oriented. In order to reach this goal, the major-
ity of interviewees would be keen on offering the possibility of workshop practice.
High energy prices not only damage competitiveness, but also directly hamper in-
vestments into environmental protection. According to big energy-consumers, the
minimum solution would be payment in conformity with consumption, which
makes the abolition of the current “bonded”, “stand-by” fee necessary.
The way out
According to several interviewees, the actors of economic policy failed to elabo-
rate and implement a long term strategy based on the analysis of the market pro-
cesses in every sector. For instance, successful foundries nowadays export their
products to Western car factories, where multinational companies re-export the
original items as components to the car-part manufacturers in Hungary. As an ex-
pert of the foundry industry and, at the same time, a manager of a successful com-
pany pointed out: it would have been more rational and economical to integrate
the domestic suppliers of the car industry, i.e. to build vertical integration
(“verticum”) under one integrator to avoid the detour of forwarding the compo-
nents to domestic car-part manufacturers. The Hungarian industry would be stron-
ger and the balance of trade would be better. The foundry industry delivers goods
not only to car-part manufacturers but e.g. to railways, power stations and hydro
stations, besides selling and buying as well. Apparently, this logic equally applies
to other vertically organised sectors.
According to the majority of enterprises, an economic policy promoting verti-
cal integration is badly needed. The desire for securing business partners – impor-
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tant to every company – is hidden behind this suggestion. Though this formulation
may seem strange at the first glance, after decades of “big state-giants in social-
ism”, looking into the matter closer the idea behind “building vertical integration”
is very rational both from a technical-technological aspect and from the point of
view of the market. The same proposal was worded by another study, also based
on company interviews. Farkas and Mészáros (2002) found that due to the fact
that no company can become viable without market (orders), the business back-
ground for small- and medium-sized enterprises might be secured by Hungarian-
owned big enterprises with suitable governmental assistance and support. The
importance of the idea of “verticum” can be fitted into Porter’s (1990) diamond
model. In this model, one of the three factors determining the firm strategy and
competitiveness is related and supporting industries, more exactly, new entrants
emerging from them. Firstly, this emergence itself is often a product of vertical in-
tegration of these sectors. Secondly, the relation between the competitiveness of a
firm and the sectors in question is not one-sided at all! A firm’s long-term compet-
itiveness is highly determined by the strategy it pursues in connection with related
and supporting sectors: building partnerships can forestall emerging rivalry.
As for economic policy, it is not enough to develop only those places of pro-
duction where profit is directly realised. After the emergence of the global net-
works of enterprises in the manufacturing industry, profit is realised more and
more at the peak of the vertical set-up (at the final goods production), or better to
say the final producer is able to withdraw value added (profit) from the lower lev-
els of the production chain. Especially, in case small- and medium-sized enter-
prises have to face big customers. But only large enterprises provided with abun-
dant capital can connect to the higher levels of the production chain. Though hav-
ing large potentials, the Hungarian enterprises do not belong to this strong com-
pany sector.
Finally, economic policy must not lose sight of the general principle that the
expenditure on micro level can be turned into income (thus paying off) or become
a saving on macro level in a multiple way. For example, if we take into consider-
ation the long list of harmful effects of unemployment (on health, social behav-
iour, mental and spiritual well-being, etc.), we find that social policy exercised
through production (employment) is significantly cheaper in the long term than
direct aid, distributed in the form of unemployment benefit. From the point of
view of curing them, social diseases do not very much differ from the illnesses of
the human body: in both cases the best solution is prevention. Not only for the
government budget, but also for the whole society it is more economical to exer-
cise the social policy (at least partly) “ex ante” or “preventively”, than “ex post”
in its independent, “clean” form.
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